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Instead of attacking their adversaries directly, states often do so indirectly by supporting rebel groups. While these support relationships vary considerably, existing research lacks a comprehensive account thereof. To explain states' choice of support, we suggest differentiating between two modes of support relationships according to the control opportunities they offer states over rebels: while delegation enables "hands-on" control, "hands-off" orchestration allows for plausible deniability and does not harm rebels' local legitimacy. We argue that sponsors prefer orchestration when "hands-on" control can be substituted by goal alignment or competition; and they prefer delegation when the conflict is highly salient. Tests using global data for the period 1975-2009 support the first two expectations. Surprisingly, states' capabilities also render "hands-off" orchestration more likely. The paper advances the understanding of external rebel support by transferring insights from indirect governance theory to the study of indirect wars and putting it to statistical test.

Instead of attacking their adversaries directly, states often do so indirectly by supporting rebel groups. While these support relationships vary considerably, existing research lacks a comprehensive account thereof. To explain states' choice of support, we suggest differentiating between two modes of support relationships according to the control opportunities they offer states over rebels: while delegation enables "hands-on" control, "hands-off" orchestration allows for plausible deniability and does not harm rebels' local legitimacy. We argue that sponsors prefer orchestration when "hands-on" control can be substituted by goal alignment or competition; and they prefer delegation when the conflict is highly salient. Tests using global data for the period 1975-2009 support the first two expectations. Surprisingly, states' capabilities also render "hands-off" orchestration more likely. The paper advances the understanding of external rebel support by transferring insights from indirect governance theory to the study of indirect wars and putting it to statistical test.

ZusammenfassungWie reagieren internationale Organisationen (IOs) auf Schuldzuweisungen ihrer Mitgliedstaaten? Oftmals werden in der Forschung IOs im Falle von gescheiterten Politiken als gute Sündenböcke für die Schuldzuweisungen ihrer Mitgliedstaaten gesehen, weil sie sich kaum zu Wehr setzen müssen, können oder wollen. Demgegenüber argumentieren wir, dass IO-RepräsentantInnen versuchen, IOs in der Öffentlichkeit nicht als Schuldige für gescheiterte Politiken dastehen zu lassen. IOs sind deshalb keine passiven "blame taker", sondern aktive "blame avoider". In manchen Fällen sind sie zwar bereit, die Schuldzuweisungen ihrer Mitgliedstaaten zuignorieren, doch in anderen Fällen versuchen sie ihre Verantwortung zuverschleiernoder sogar die Mitgliedstaaten zuattackieren. Um dies zu erklären, entwickeln wir eine Theorie der Schuldvermeidung von IOs, gemäß derer die Autorität einer IO bestimmt, welche Schuldvermeidungsstrategie ihre RepräsentantInnen einschlagen. Je nachdem, ob eine IO im betreffenden Politikfeld Autorität intergouvernemental, supranational oder hybrid ausübt, wird sie auf Schuldzuweisungen ihrer Mitgliedstaaten durch Strategien des Ignorierens, Verschleierns oder Attackierens reagieren. Wir demonstrieren die Plausibilität unserer Theorie mithilfe einer Medieninhaltsanalyse der Verantwortungsattributionen der Europäischen Kommission für drei umstrittene EU-Migrationspolitiken. Wir tragen damit zum besseren Verständnis der öffentlichen Schuldvermeidungsstrategien von IOs bei.

AbstractGovernments across the world increasingly rely on non-state agents for managing even the most sensitive tasks that range from running critical infrastructures to protecting citizens. While private agents frequently underperform, governments as principals tend nonethelessnotto enforce delegation contracts. Why? We suggest the mechanism of institutional resilience. A preexisting set of rules shapes non-enforcement through the combination of (i) itsstructural misfitwith the delegation contract and (ii)asymmetric interdependencethat favors the agent over time. To demonstrate the plausibility of our argument, we trace the political process behind Europe's largest military transport aircraft, the A400M. Governments delegated the development and production of this complex program to a private firm, Airbus. They layered a 'commercial approach' onto traditionally state-run defense industries. Yet, resilience caused these new formal rules to fail and eventually disarmed principals. Our mechanism constitutes an innovative approach by theorizing an alternative path toward dynamic continuity.

First published online: 6 May 2020 ; Governments across the world increasingly rely on non-state agents for managing even the most sensitive tasks that range from running critical infrastructures to protecting citizens. While private agents frequently underperform, governments as principals tend nonetheless not to enforce delegation contracts. Why? We suggest the mechanism of institutional resilience. A preexisting set of rules shapes non-enforcement through the combination of (i) its structural misfit with the delegation contract and (ii) asymmetric interdependence that favors the agent over time. To demonstrate the plausibility of our argument, we trace the political process behind Europe's largest military transport aircraft, the A400M. Governments delegated the development and production of this complex program to a private firm, Airbus. They layered a 'commercial approach' onto traditionally state-run defense industries. Yet, resilience caused these new formal rules to fail and eventually disarmed principals. Our mechanism constitutes an innovative approach by theorizing an alternative path toward dynamic continuity.

AbstractWho blames whom in multilevel blame games? Existing research focuses either on policymakers' preferences or their opportunities offered by the institutional structures in which policymakers operate. As these two strands of literature barely refer to each other, in this article we develop an integrated theoretical model of blame‐shifting in multilevel governance systems and assess it empirically. In line with the first strand, we assume that policymakers have a preference for shifting blame onto actors on a different level from themselves. In line with the second, we suppose that opportunities for doing so depend on institutional responsibility for policymaking and policy implementation. We check the plausibility of our integrated model by examining policymakers' blame attributions in three cases where European Union migration policies have been contested: border control, asylum, and welfare entitlements. We find that our integrated model does better in explaining blame‐shifting in these cases than the isolated models.

Supplementary material for the article "Multi-level Blame Games: Blame-shifting in the EU" (Tim Heinkelmann-Wild and Bernhard Zangl) accepted for publication by Governance at October 7, 2019.

Internationale Institutionen werden vermehrt durch westliche Mächte attackiert, die gemeinhin dem Kern der "liberalen internationalen Ordnung" zugerechnet werden. Die Intensität und die Modi ihrer institutionellen Kontestation variieren jedoch stark. Unser Beitrag untersucht, inwiefern institutionelle Faktoren - Merkmale und Effekte der kontestierten Institution - die Wahl unterschiedlicher Modi der institutionellen Kontestation durch westliche Mächte beeinflussen. Wir konzeptualisieren vier Modi der Kontestation internationaler Institutionen: Kritik, Subversion, Rückzug und Sabotage. Wir argumentieren, dass der Modus der Kontestation wesentlich von spezifischen institutionellen Machtkonfigurationen beeinflusst wird. Diese ergeben sich aus dem Grad der internen Kontrolle, die eine Institution unzufriedenen Mächten gewährt, und aus den externen Effekten, die eine Institution auch nach einem Rückzug auf diese ausübt bzw. ausüben würde. Wir überprüfen die Plausibilität unserer Theorie anhand der Kontestation der Weltbank, der Welthandelsorganisation, des Übereinkommens von Paris zum Klimawandel und des Iran-Atomabkommens durch die USA unter der Trump-Administration.

Blame games between governing and opposition parties are a characteristic feature of domestic politics. In the EU, policymaking authority is shared among multiple actors across different levels of governance. How does EU integration affect the dynamics of domestic blame games? Drawing on the literatures on EU politicisation and blame attribution in multi-level governance systems, we derive expectations about the direction and frequency of blame attributions in a Europeanized setting. We argue, first, that differences in the direction and frequency of blame attributions by governing and opposition parties are shaped by their diverging baseline preferences as blame avoiders and blame generators; secondly, we posit that differences in blame attributions across Europeanized policies are shaped by variation in political authority structures, which incentivize certain attributions while constraining others. We hypothesize, inter alia, that blame games are "Europeanized" primarily by governing parties and when policy-implementing authority rests with EU-level actors. We test our theoretical expectations by analysing parliamentary debates on EU asylum system policy and EU border control policy in Austria and Germany.

Blame games between governing and opposition parties are a characteristic feature of domestic politics. In the EU, policymaking authority is shared among multiple actors across different levels of governance. How does EU integration affect the dynamics of domestic blame games? Drawing on the literatures on EU politicisation and blame attribution in multi-level governance systems, we derive expectations about the direction and frequency of blame attributions in a Europeanized setting. We argue, first, that differences in the direction and frequency of blame attributions by governing and opposition parties are shaped by their diverging baseline preferences as blame avoiders and blame generators; secondly, we posit that differences in blame attributions across Europeanized policies are shaped by variation in political authority structures, which incentivize certain attributions while constraining others. We hypothesize, inter alia, that blame games are "Europeanized" primarily by governing parties and when policy-implementing authority rests with EU-level actors. We test our theoretical expectations by analysing parliamentary debates on EU asylum system policy and EU border control policy in Austria and Germany.

Supplementary material for Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Lisa Kriegmair, and Berthold Rittberger (2020). The EU Multi-level System and the Europeanization of Domestic Blame Games. In: Politics and Governance 8(1).

Supplementary material for Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Lisa Kriegmair, and Berthold Rittberger (2020). The EU Multi-level System and the Europeanization of Domestic Blame Games. In: Politics and Governance 8(1).

International organisations have become increasingly contested resulting in worries about their decline and termination. While international organisation termination is indeed a regular event in international relations, this article shows that other institutions carry the legacy of terminated international organisations. We develop the novel concept of international organisation afterlife and suggest indicators to systematically assess it. Our analysis of 26 major terminated international organisations reveals legal-institutional and asset continuity in 21 cases. To further illustrate this point, the article zooms in on the afterlife of the International Institute of Agriculture in the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Western European Union in the European Union. In these three cases, international organisation afterlife inspired and structured the design of their successor institutions. While specific international organisations might be terminated, international cooperation therefore often lives on in other institutions.